In the present event-related potential study, we investigated whether and how participants playing the ultimatum game as responders modulate their decisions according to the proposers' stereotypical identity. The proposers' identity was manipulated using occupational role nouns stereotypically marked with gender (e.g., Teacher; Engineer), paired with either feminine or masculine proper names (e.g., Anna; David). Greater FRN amplitudes reflected the early processing of the conflict between the strategic rule (i.e., earning as much money as possible) and ready-to-go responses (i.e., refusing unequal offers and discriminating proposers according to their stereotype). Responders were found to rely on a dual-process system (i.e., automatic and heuristic-based system 1 vs. cognitively costly and deliberative system 2), the P300 amplitude reflecting the switch from a decision making system to another. Greater P300 amplitudes were found in response to both fair and unfair offers and male-stereotyped proposers' offers reflecting an automatic decision making based on heuristics, while lower P300 amplitudes were found in response to 3€ offers and the female-stereotyped proposers' offers reflecting a more deliberative reasoning. Overall, the results indicate that participants were more motivated to engage in a costly deliberative reasoning associated with an increase in acceptation rate when playing with female-stereotyped proposers, who may have induced more positive and emphatic feelings in the participants than did malestereotyped proposers. Then, we assume that people with an occupation stereotypically marked with female gender and engaged in an economic negotiation may benefit from their occupation at least in the case their counterparts lose their money if the negotiation fails.
Introduction
The interest on how social and emotional information affects economic decision-making has steadily grown over the past decades (for overviews, see Frith and Singer, 2008; Rilling and Sanfey, 2011) . A key insight on the influence of social aspects on economic decision-making has come from studies using a well-known paradigm, the ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982) . In the classic version of this two-player game, a proposer offers to split a fixed amount of money (e.g., 10€) to a responder. Both get their shares only if the responder accepts the offer. When game partners behave as the self-interested, income maximizer homo economicus (Camerer, 2003; Gaertig et al., 2012) , predictions are straightforward: proposers should offer the smallest amount of money and responders should accept any kind of offer. However, a range of studies demonstrates that the great majority of people deviate from utility-based expected behaviors (Camerer, 2003) . Indeed, proposers mainly offer shares close to a 50-50 division (Thaler, 1988; Roth, 1995; Güth, 1995; Camerer and Thaler, 1995) and responders reject low shares (i.e., 20% of the total or less) in more than 50% of the cases (Güth et al., 1982; Camerer, 1999 Camerer, , 2003 Sanfey, 2009) .
Models of social preference diversely accounted for responders' rejection behavior (for a review, see Fehr and Schmidt, 2005) . On one hand, theories of inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) posit that people are simply and naturally averse to unequal distributions. On another hand, theories of negative reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) focus on proposers' intentions, describing the rejection as a way to punish selfish proposers at a personal cost for behaving in a self-interested manner (i.e., altruistic punishment; Fehr and Gächter, 2002 
